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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                               
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
     We are asked to decide whether a policy adopted by the Black 
Horse Pike Regional Board of Education that allows a vote of the 
senior class to determine if prayer will be included in high 
school graduation ceremonies is constitutional.  For the reasons 
that follow we hold that this policy is inconsistent with the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Accordingly,  
we will affirm, but modify, the permanent injunction issued by 
the district court. 
 
                      I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
     The Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education (the 
"School Board" or "Board") has had a longstanding tradition of 
including a nonsectarian invocation and benediction in high 
school graduation ceremonies.  These prayers have historically 
been delivered by local clergy on a rotating basis in an attempt 
to afford different denominations the opportunity to be 
represented. 
     In May of 1993, the School Board decided to reconsider this 
policy because of the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992), wherein the Court invalidated a public 
school's practice of including prayer in graduation ceremonies.   
As part of the Board's reexamination, the Superintendent of 
Schools tendered a policy entitled "Religion at Graduation 
Exercises" IKFD ("Version A") for the Board's consideration.  
Version A prohibited all prayer at graduation ceremonies.  The 
Board rejected that policy and directed the school administration 
to prepare a second version that would parallel the holding of 
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th 
Cir. 1992).  The court in Jones had upheld a public school policy 
that allowed students to determine for themselves whether or not 
a prayer would be delivered at their graduation.  
     Two policies were presented to the Board at its May 23, 1993 
meeting.  One version allowed graduating students to decide 
whether prayer would be included in the graduation ceremony as 
well as the nature of any such prayer ("Version D").  The other 
proposal would not have allowed "prayer" but would have allowed a 
"moment of reflection, during which pupils and parents [could] be 
asked to think silently about what has been and what is to come 
for each graduate."  App. at 144.  A group of students who had 
previously asked to address the Board on this issue attended the 
meeting and spoke in favor of Version D.  At the conclusion of 
the meeting, the Board unanimously adopted Version D.  That 
policy, as finally adopted, allowed the senior class officers to 
conduct a poll of the graduating class to determine whether 
seniors wanted "prayer, a moment of reflection, or nothing at 
all" to be included in their graduation ceremony.  App. at 180.  
The policy was entitled, "Religion at Graduation Exercises," and 
the text began as follows:  
                    After reading recent decisions of the United 
                    States Supreme Court and interpretations of 
                    those decisions, the Board of Education 
                    concludes the long standing practice of 
                    conducting invocation and benediction prayer 
                    at graduation ceremonies and at other school 
                    functions is proper and legal under the 
                    following conditions: 
                     
                    1.   The Board of Education, administration 
                    and staff of the schools shall not endorse, 
                    organize or in any way promote prayer at 
                    school functions. 
                     
                    2.   In the spirit of protected speech, the 
                    pupils in attendance must choose to have 
                    prayer conducted. Such prayer must be 
                    performed by a student volunteer and may not 
                    be conducted by a member of the clergy or 
                    staff. 
                     
          Policy IKFD, Version D, App. at 180.   
     The policy also allowed the students to decide how they 
would determine what form of prayer, if any, would be given at 
graduation, "so long as the process [was] conducted by duly 
elected class officers and the survey . . . provides pupils with 
an opportunity to choose prayer, a moment of reflection, or 
nothing at all."  Version D of Policy IKFD further required that 
printed programs for the graduation include a disclaimer 
explaining that any presentation that may be given at 
commencement did not reflect the views of the School Board, the 
School District, administrators, staff, or other students.  
     On June 3, 1993, Principal Frank Palatucci of the Highland 
Regional High School explained the Board's decision to the 
students during the morning announcements over the school public 
address system.  After he explained the policy, he introduced the 
senior class president who explained that a poll would be taken 
of the senior class, and how the balloting would be conducted. 
The vote was taken the next day and produced the following 
results: 128 students voted for prayer, 120 for reflection/moment 
of silence, and 20 voted to have neither.  Students then 
volunteered to deliver the graduation prayer, and the senior 
class officers selected the senior class recording secretary from 
among those volunteers.  
     On June 9, Edward Ross, a member of the senior class,  
approached Principal Palatucci and requested that a 
representative from the ACLU also be permitted to speak at the 
graduation to discuss safe sex and condom distribution.  
Principal Palatucci denied Ross' request explaining that the time 
constraints of the ceremony would not permit a keynote speaker, 
and that the topic requested was not generally one discussed at 
graduation ceremonies.   
 
                      II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
     On June 18, 1993, the ACLU and Edward Ross filed a Complaint 
in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, in which 
they asked the court to enjoin any student-led prayer at 
graduation.  The Complaint alleged that the proposed prayer 
violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution.   
     By Order entered June 24, 1993, the district court denied 
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.  The court 
concluded that the proposed prayer was appropriate because it was 
given under circumstances that distinguished it from the 
prohibited prayer in Lee v. Weisman.  The following day the 
plaintiffs filed an emergency appeal to this court where a two- 
judge panel reversed the district court and entered an order that 
stated in part:  
               [T]he graduation ceremony is a school 
          sponsored event; the fact that the school 
          board has chosen to delegate the decision 
          regarding one segment of the ceremony to the 
          members of the graduating class does not 
          alter that sponsorship, does not diminish the 
          effect of a prayer on students who do not 
          share the same or any religious perspective, 
          and does not serve to distinguish, in any 
          material way, the facts of this case from the 
          facts of Lee v. Weisman,     U.S.   , 112 S. 
          Ct. 2649 (1992);  
 
               . . .  
 
               Now, therefore, . . . appellees, their 
          agents and employees, and all those acting in 
          concert with them are hereby enjoined from 
          conducting a school sponsored graduation 
          ceremony that includes a prayer whether it be 
          an invocation, a benediction or a prayer in 
          any other form. 
App. at 199-200. 
     Thereafter, the School Board filed a motion in this court to 
vacate the preliminary injunction.  That motion was denied. 
Additional motions were subsequently filed both in this court and 
in the United States Supreme Court.  Finally, on March 29, 1994, 
the district court entered a final order, consistent with the 
aforementioned order of this court, reversing the court's 
previous denial of the preliminary injunction.  The district 
court permanently enjoined the School Board from "conducting a 
school-sponsored graduation ceremony that include[d] prayer, 
whether it be an invocation, a benediction or a prayer in any 
other form."  App. at 210.  On April 28, 1994, the School Board 
filed this appeal.  The matter is now before this court in banc. 
 
                     III. OUR SCOPE OF REVIEW     We review a district 
court's decision to grant or deny a 
permanent injunction under an abuse of discretion standard.  
International Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 94 
(3d Cir. 1987).  "An abuse of discretion exists where the 
district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application 
of law to fact."  Id. at 95. 
     In this case, the district court did not render a decision 
on the merits as to whether plaintiffs were entitled to a 
permanent injunction.  Instead, the district court granted a 
permanent injunction solely because it believed it was bound to 
do so by the law of the case in light of the emergency ruling of 
a two-judge panel of this court granting plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  As the district court expressly stated 
in its order: 
          Additional hearings or new evidence might 
          have put a different cast on the issues, but 
          as the record has not been augmented since 
          the motion for a preliminary injunction, we 
          feel constrained to enter a final judgment in 
          accordance with the Third Circuit's order of 
          June 25, 1993.  We make it clear that the 
          opinion of the Court remains that expressed 
          in the oral opinion of June 24, 1993.  
          However, due regard for our "hierarchical 
          federal judicial system," particularly where 
          the reviewing panel has had the same record 
          as the Court, requires us to respect the 
          findings of the Third Circuit. 
Order of March 29, 1994, at 3 (citations omitted). 
     The district court erred in concluding that it was so bound.  
The two-judge panel assessed the merits on an emergency basis 
under the standard for the granting of a preliminary injunction 
-- a standard which differs from the standard for granting a 
permanent injunction.  Its decision to grant a preliminary 
injunction was based on an assessment of the likelihood that 
plaintiffs would succeed on the merits, and neither constitutes 
nor substitutes for an actual finding that plaintiffs havesucceeded on the 
merits and are entitled to permanent relief.  
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that the district 
court ever applied the legal standard for granting a permanentinjunction 
or otherwise based its decision upon an assessment of 
the merits of the case.     
     It is well-established, however, that "if the decision below 
is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied 
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason."  Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937); see also Erie 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 
n.10 (3d Cir. 1988).  We will therefore proceed to address the 
merits of this matter to determine whether, despite the district 
court's error, the permanent injunction was properly issued on 
some other ground.   
 
                        IV.  DISCUSSION  
             A. The Free Speech Rights of Students 
     The Board relies upon the student referendum in an attempt 
to define the instant controversy as one impacting upon the 
students' right of free speech as opposed to a dispute over the 
constitutionality of prayer at a public high school graduation. 
Version D of Policy IKFD does state: "[i]n the spirit of 
protected free speech, the pupils in attendance must choose to 
have prayer conducted,"  App. at 180.  However, Version D allowed 
the 128 seniors who wanted verbal prayer at their graduation to 
impose their will upon 140 of their fellow classmates who did 
not.  The Board's position would have us recognize a right in 
that plurality to do so, and ignore the right of others to 
worship in a different manner, or in no manner at all.  This we 
can not do because "the individual freedom of conscience 
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any 
religious faith or none at all."  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 52 (1985).  Therefore, the Board's emphasis on voting 
majorities is misplaced.  "While in some societies the wishes of 
the majority might prevail, the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment is addressed to this contingency and rejects the 
balance urged upon us."  Lee, 505 U.S. at 596.     
                    Just as the right to speak and the right to 
                    refrain from speaking are complementary 
                    components of a broader concept of individual 
                    freedom of mind, so also the individual's 
                    freedom to choose his own creed is the 
                    counterpart of his right to refrain from 
                    accepting the creed established by the 
                    majority. 
           
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52. 
     An impermissible practice can not be transformed into a 
constitutionally acceptable one by putting a democratic process 
to an improper use.  There should be no question "that the 
electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could 
not order [governmental] action violative of the [Constitution], 
and the [government] may not avoid the strictures of [the 
Constitution] by deferring to the wishes or objections of some 
fraction of the body politic."  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (citation omitted).  A 
policy that does this can not be legitimized by arguing that it 
promotes the free speech of the majority.   
                         The First Amendment protects speech and 
                    religion by quite different mechanisms. 
                    Speech is protected by insuring its full 
                    expression . . . . The method for protecting 
                    freedom of worship and freedom of conscience 
                    in religious matters is quite the reverse. . 
                    . . The Free Exercise Clause embraces a 
                    freedom of conscience and worship that has 
                    close parallels in the speech provisions of 
                    the First Amendment, but the Establishment 
                    Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of 
                    state intervention in religious affairs with 
                    no precise counterpart in the speech 
                    provisions. 
           
Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.   
     Although it is necessary to reconcile one's own preferences 
to the results of a referendum when choosing one's 
representatives or voting upon legislative matters, the First 
Amendment does not allow one's religious preferences to be 
compromised in this manner.  
                    The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
                    withdraw certain subjects from the 
                    vicissitudes of political controversy, to 
                    place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
                    officials and to establish them as legal 
                    principles to be applied by the courts. One's 
                    . . . fundamental rights may not be submitted 
                    to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
                    elections. 
                     
          Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
     High school graduation ceremonies have not been regarded, 
either by law or tradition, as public fora where a multiplicity 
of views on any given topic, secular or religious, can be 
expressed and exchanged.  School officials at Highland did not 
allow a representative of the ACLU to speak about "safe sex" and 
condom distribution at graduation, as requested by one of the 
graduating seniors.  The question was not submitted to referendum 
of the graduating seniors because the principal understandably 
determined that the proposed topic was not suitable for 
graduation.  We do not suggest that the school's response to this 
request was inappropriate.  However, we do note that the response 
illustrates the degree of control the administration retained 
over student speech at graduation.  Version D was not intended to 
broaden the rights of students to speak at graduation, nor to 
convert the graduation ceremony into a public forum.  Cf. Capitol 
Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,    U.S.  , 115 S. Ct. 
2440, 2450 (1995) ("Religious expression cannot violate the 
Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) 
occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly 
announced and open to all on equal terms.").   
     Accordingly, we fail to see how this particular policy, 
addressed only to providing an option for continuing prayer at 
graduation after Lee, can be legitimized as promoting the free 
speech rights of the students.  
 
                        B. Lee v. Weisman 
     The degree of control that school officials retained over 
the speech that would be permitted at graduation is also relevant 
under Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  There, the principal 
of a public middle school invited a rabbi to deliver the 
invocation and benediction at the school's graduation, in 
accordance with school district practice.  The principal gave the 
rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines to be followed in giving 
public prayers at civic occasions and told the rabbi that the 
prayers should be non-sectarian.  Id. at 581.  The graduation 
ceremony at which the prayers were given was held on school 
property, and the parties stipulated that attendance at the 
ceremony was voluntary.  After the processional, the students 
remained standing for the Pledge of Allegiance, and for the 
rabbi's very brief invocation. 
     In ruling the prayer unconstitutional, the Supreme Court 
emphasized:  
               These dominant facts mark and control 
          the confines of our decision: [1] State 
          officials direct the performance of a formal 
          religious exercise at promotional and 
          graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.  
          [2] Even for those students who object to the 
          religious exercise, their attendance and 
          participation in the state sponsored 
          religious activity are in a fair and real 
          sense obligatory, though the school district 
          does not require attendance as a condition 
          for receipt of the diploma. 
Id. at 586.  Accordingly, we must examine (1) the state's control 
of the graduation ceremony, and (2) the students' coerced 
participation in the ceremony here. 
                               (1) 
     The School Board argues that the student referendum here 
significantly distinguishes this case from Lee.  We disagree.  It 
is, of course, true that the state's entanglement with the 
graduation prayer in Lee was more obvious, pronounced, and 
intrusive than the School District's involvement here.  In Lee, 
the principal decided prayer would be included in the ceremony, 
chose the clergy person who would give the prayer, and even 
determined part of the content of the prayer by giving the 
invited clergy guidelines for the substance of the prayer.  Id.at 587.  It 
is no wonder then, that the resulting prayer "bore 
the imprint of the State."  Id. at 590.   
     Although the state's involvement here is certainly less 
evident, the student referendum does not erase the state's 
imprint from this graduation prayer.  Graduation at Highland 
Regional High School, like graduation at nearly any other school, 
is a school sponsored event.  School officials decide the 
sequence of events and the order of speakers on the program, and 
ceremonies are typically held on school property at no cost to 
the students.  App. at 118-26.  The atmosphere at Highland's 
graduations is characterized by order and uniformity.  School 
officials necessarily "retain a high degree of control over the 
precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the 
movements, the dress, and the decorum of the students."  Lee, 505 
U.S. at 597.  Principal Palatucci testified before the district 
court that any student who attempted to give an unscheduled 
address at graduation in contravention of administrative 
direction would be arrested if police were available, even if a 
majority of the graduating students had previously approved.  The 
district court carefully questioned the principal about what he 
would do if a majority of the student body, without 
administrative approval, voted to have a speaker who would not be 
included in the program but would be introduced by the 
valedictorian and allowed to give a one minute speech.  The 
principal responded: "I couldn't allow that to happen. . . . If I 
have a police officer, I have her arrested."  App. at 125.  Thus, 
the school officials' involvement and control is not as limited, 
unintrusive, or neutral as the School Board suggests.   
     Delegation of one aspect of the ceremony to a plurality of 
students does not constitute the absence of school officials' 
control over the graduation.  Students decided the question of 
prayer at graduation only because school officials agreed to let 
them decide that one question.  Although the delegation here may 
appear to many to be no more than a neutral means of deciding 
whether prayer should be included in the graduation, it does not 
insulate the School Board from the reach of the First Amendment.  
"[C]ourts must keep in mind both the fundamental place held by 
the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the 
myriad, subtle ways in which the Establishment Clause values can 
be eroded."  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
     Furthermore, the text of Version D affirms that it was 
adopted in response to Lee.  The Board's avowed purpose in 
reexamining its policy was to provide an option that might allow 
the "longstanding tradition" of graduation prayer to survive the 
prohibitions of that Supreme Court decision.  We believe that the 
control exercised by state officials here, though different in 
degree than was present in Lee, is not sufficiently distinct to 
require a different result under the "first dominant fact" of 
Lee.   
                               (2) 
     "[T]here are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of 
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools."  Lee. 505 U.S. at 592.  We find no 
difference whatsoever between the coercion in Lee and the 
coercion here.  A high school graduation is distinguishable from 
forums such as a legislative session where prayer has been 
upheld.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).  
Legislators "may presumably absent themselves from such public 
and ceremonial exercises without incurring any penalty, direct or 
indirect."  School Dist. of Abington Twnshp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 299-300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).  The same cannot 
be said of students at their high school graduation.   
     "The fact that attendance at the graduation ceremonies is 
voluntary in a legal sense does not save the religious exercise."  
Lee, 505 U.S. at 596.  The objector's presence at his or her 
graduation compels participation in the religious observance 
decreed by the results of the poll that is sanctioned under 
Version D.  This, the Constitution does not allow. 
                    What to most believers may seem nothing more 
                    than a reasonable request that the 
                    nonbeliever respect their religious 
                    practices, in a school context may appear to 
                    the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt 
                    to employ the machinery of the State to 
                    enforce a religious orthodoxy. 
                     
                         . . . The undeniable fact is that the 
                    school district's supervision and control of 
                    a high school graduation ceremony places 
                    public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on 
                    attending students to stand as a group or, at 
                    least, maintain respectful silence during the 
                    Invocation and Benediction.  This pressure, 
                    though subtle and indirect, can be as real as 
                    any overt compulsion. . . . [F]or the 
                    dissenter of high school age, who has a 
                    reasonable perception that she is being 
                    forced by the State to pray in a manner her 
                    conscience will not allow, the injury is . . 
                    . real.   
                     
          Id. at 592-93.  Even the appearance of participation should be 
avoided in this setting.  Id. at 588 (students "had no real 
alternative which would have allowed [them] to avoid the fact or 
appearance of participation"). 
     Here, the hypothetical dissenter in Lee is replaced by 140 
students who voted not to have a formal prayer at their public 
high school graduation.  The Board's policy would have required 
each of those 140 students to participate (or at the very least 
maintain respectful silence) as others engaged in student-led 
worship.  "It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise."  Id. at 587.  
Here, as in Lee, "[t]he prayer exercises . . . are especially 
improper because the State has in every practical sense compelled 
attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at 
an event of singular importance to every student, one the 
objecting student had no real alternative to avoid."  Id. at 598. 
Students at Highland had to either conform to the model of 
worship commanded by the plurality or absent themselves from 
graduation and thereby forego one of the most important events in 
their lives.  That is an improper choice to force upon dissenting 
students.  
          [T]o say a teenage student has a real choice 
          not to attend her high school graduation is 
          formalistic in the extreme. . . . Everyone 
          knows that in our society and in our culture 
          high school graduation is one of life's most 
          significant occasions.  A school rule which 
          excuses attendance is beside the point.   
 
Id. at 595.  "The Constitution forbids the State to exact 
religious conformity from a student as the price of attending his  
own high school graduation."  Id. at 596. 
     The First Amendment is a shield that prohibits the state 
from interfering with a person's right to worship as he or she 
pleases.  It is not a sword that can be used to compel others to 
join in a religious observance at a state sponsored event.  "The 
First Amendment has lost much if the religious follower and the 
atheist are no longer to be judicially regarded as entitled to 
equal justice under law."  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting).  
                    The sole question presented is whether a 
                    religious exercise may be conducted at a 
                    graduation ceremony in circumstances where . 
                    . . young graduates who object are induced to 
                    conform.  No holding by th[e Supreme Court] 
                    suggests a school can persuade or compel a 
                    student to participate in a religious 
                    exercise.  That is being done here, and it is 
                    forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the 
                    First Amendment. 
           
Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.   
     It is, of course, true that the often referenced "wall of 
separation" between church and state has recently been described 
as more "metaphor" than reality.  However, even if the "wall" is 
more metaphor than mortar, it is sufficiently unyielding to 
prevent prayer from being included as a formal part of the 
graduation ceremony under Version D of Policy IKFD.   
 
     The disclaimer required under Version D does help to 
recapture some of the separation between church and state that 
has been obscured by the state's control over the graduation. 
However, the Board cannot sanction coerced participation in a 
religious observance merely by disclaiming responsibility for the 
content of the ceremony. Given the protections inherent in the 
First Amendment, it is quite possible that parents of some 
graduating seniors chose public education precisely so that their 
children would not be compelled to follow the religious beliefs 
of others.  Yet, that is exactly what Version D allows.   
       We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has reached a result contrary to the one we reach today. 
See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).   Indeed, as 
stated earlier, the administration at Highland promulgated 
Version D pursuant to the Board's instruction to develop a policy 
that would parallel the holding of Jones.  We are not, however, 
persuaded by that court's analysis.  Jones also involved a 
challenge to a policy that allowed students to decide if they 
wanted prayer at a public school's graduation ceremony.  The 
Jones court upheld the policy while acknowledging that "the 
practical result of [its] decision, viewed in light of Lee, is 
that a majority of students can do what the State acting on its 
own cannot do to incorporate prayer in public high school 
graduation ceremonies."  Id. at 972.   
     That court recently reaffirmed that ruling in Ingebretsen v. 
Jackson Public Sch. Dist., No. 94-60631, 1996 WL 205, *6 (5th 
Cir. Jan. 10, 1996) (affirming an order that enjoined enforcement 
of a Mississippi statute allowing prayer at compulsory and 
noncompulsory school events, "except as to nonsectarian, 
nonproselytizing student initiated voluntary prayer at high 
school commencement as condoned by Jones . . . .").   In Doe v. 
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995), the 
court again addressed the limits of school prayer in public 
schools, but in the context of extra-curricular activities for 
which students received academic credit.  The court held that the 
school district's practice of allowing its employees to initiate 
or merely participate in prayers at basketball games and 
basketball practices was unconstitutional.  The court 
distinguished Jones by noting that graduation prayer occurred at 
a "once-in-a-lifetime event that could be appropriately marked 
with a prayer," that the students in Jones were mature seniors, 
and "that the challenged prayer was to be non-sectarian and non- 
proselytizing."  Id. at 406-07. 
     We are not persuaded by these distinctions.  Lee clearly 
established that the "once-in-a-lifetime event" does not justify 
allowing a public school to authorize collective prayer under the 
circumstances of that case.  To the contrary, the significance of 
that "once-in-a-lifetime" event weighed heavily in favor of 
invalidating the prayer.  It was precisely because graduation was 
a "once-in-a-lifetime" event that students were denied the option 
of foregoing the ceremony to avoid compromising their religious 
scruples.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 595-96.  Similarly, the Court in 
Lee was not convinced that the maturity level of high school 
students immunized them from the coercion endemic in coerced 
participation.  Id. at 593 ("[F]or the dissenter of high school 
age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by 
the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the 
injury is no less real.").  Indeed, few would doubt the influence 
of peer pressure upon children in high school.  Furthermore, we 
are not inclined to alter our analysis merely because Version D 
does not expressly allow proselytization.  See County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chp., 492 U.S. 573, 606-09. 
     Instead, we find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 
447 (9th Cir. 1994) to be more persuasive.  There, plaintiffs 
challenged a school district's policy of allowing graduating 
seniors to vote on whether prayer should be included in their 
graduation ceremony.  The court concluded that the challenged 
practice violated the Establishment Clause even though any 
graduation prayer would have to be initiated, selected, and 
delivered by students.   
                    We cannot allow the school district's 
                    delegate to make decisions that the school 
                    district cannot make.  When the senior class 
                    is given plenary power over a state- 
                    sponsored, state-controlled event such as 
                    high school graduation, it is just as 
                    constrained by the Constitution as the state 
                    would be. 
          Id. at 455.     
     The court noted that faculty members and administrators 
still supervised and controlled the graduation ceremony, and the 
school district assumed the cost of the event.  Thus, the state's 
involvement offended the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 454-55.  
"[T]hat school officials cannot divest themselves of 
constitutional responsibility by allowing the students to make 
crucial decisions should not be surprising. . . .  Elected 
officials cannot avoid constitutional mandates by putting them to 
a majority vote."  Id. at 455.  Indeed, if the vitality of our 
fundamental liberties turned upon their ability to inspire the 
support of a majority, the longevity of our "inalienable rights" 
would be controlled by the ebb and flow of political and social 
passion.  
                       C. Lemon v. Kurtzman 
     In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court 
announced a three part test to determine if a government practice 
offends the Establishment Clause.  Under Lemon, a government 
practice regarding religion will not offend the Establishment 
Clause if: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal or 
primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it 
does not create an excessive entanglement of the government with 
religion.  Id. at 612-13.  "The" Lemon test has been referred to 
as one test, although the case itself suggests that it is a 
compilation of several approaches that have been used in 
conducting an inquiry under the Establishment Clause.  Justice 
O'Connor has observed that "setting forth a unitary test for a 
broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than good. . . . 
Lemon has, with some justification, been criticized on this 
score."  Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. 
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2499 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]t seems to me that 
the case law will better be able to evolve . . . if it is freed 
from the Lemon test's rigid influence.").  Nevertheless, the 
framework of Lemon remains.  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., 
concurring) ("Lemon v. Kurtzman identifies standards that have 
proved useful in analyzing case after case both in our decisions 
and in those of other courts.  It is the only coherent test a 
majority of the Court has ever adopted.") (citation omitted); seealso 
Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) (applying the "now well-defined three- 
part test" of Lemon) and Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I remain convinced of the general 
validity of the basic principles stated in Lemon, which have 
guided this Court's Establishment Clause decisions in over 30 
cases.").    
     The Lemon test has been the subject of critical debate in 
recent years, and its continuing vitality has been called into 
question by members of the Supreme Court and by its noticeable 
absence from the analysis in some of the Court's recent decisions 
(including Lee).  Nevertheless, Lemon remains the law of the 
land, and we are obligated to consider it until instructed 
otherwise by a majority of the Supreme Court.  See Thurston Motor 
Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) 
("only [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents" 
and until such occurs, precedent "is still good law").    
                      (1) A Secular Purpose 
     The Board argues that Version D has the secular purpose of 
recognizing the students' rights to free speech and their desire 
to solemnize the occasion.  As we noted earlier, the Board's 
proclamation of the purpose of promoting free speech must be 
viewed in context with the policy's emphasis on providing an 
option that would allow prayer to be delivered at graduation 
after Lee.  
     "Law reaches past formalism."  Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.  We 
have already explained why the Board's assertion of the secular 
purpose of free speech does not control.  See supra part IV.A.   
"`Graduation ceremonies have never served as forums for public 
debate or discussions, or as a forum through which to allow 
varying groups to voice their views.'"  Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 
1108, 1118 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).  Version D is no 
different in this respect.  Principal Palatucci's testimony as to 
his readiness to arrest any student who might attempt to speak at 
graduation without prior approval of the administration (even if 
the graduates have approved) demonstrates the degree to which 
Version D is intended to further the secular purpose of free 
speech.   
     Prayer is, of course, religious speech, see Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962).  However, the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech does not secularize Version D's attempt 
to preserve "the long standing practice of conducting invocation 
and benediction prayer at graduation ceremonies."  The 
Superintendent of Schools testified that when students were 
previously allowed to speak at graduation, their speeches had to 
be reviewed and approved by a faculty adviser or other school 
official; students were not allowed to speak on whatever topic 
they chose and the content of student speeches -- even when 
authorized -- was monitored.  App. at 132-33.  Yet, Version D 
prohibits school officials from reviewing the content of any 
student-led prayer that may be given.  This "hands-off" approach 
only applies to religious speech, and is in stark contrast to the 
possibility of arrest that confronts a student who gives a 
secular presentation without prior authorization.  The dualism 
is, however, consistent with the Board's desire to avoid one of 
the obstacles that invalidated the prayer in Lee (the 
administration's control over the content of the prayer). 
     In addition, Version D permits a student to give a 
sectarian, proselytizing address.  If a student were to decide to 
give such an address after a student referendum "authorized" 
verbal prayer, the administration could not halt it without 
violating its own policy.  If this were to occur, a proselytizing 
prayer (perhaps even degrading other religions) would be 
delivered in a forum controlled by the School Board.  "A system 
which secures the right to proselytize religious . . . causes 
must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster 
such concepts."  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 51.  Version D fails to 
achieve this balance.  
     The Board also argues that the inclusion of prayer 
solemnizes the graduation, but we are unable to understand why 
graduation would be any less solemn if students were not 
permitted to vote for prayer, a moment of silence or no 
observance at graduation.  Surely students who graduate in a year 
where students may chose to have no prayer at all would think 
their graduation to be a solemn event, and it is doubtful that 
the Board would disagree with that assessment.  The Supreme Court 
has approved religious invocations to solemnize the opening of 
legislative sessions, see Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (1983) (a 
context easily distinguishable from a public high school 
graduation as noted supra).  The Court has also upheld religious 
references such as the "governmental declaration of Thanksgiving 
as a public holiday; printing `In God We Trust' on coins; and 
opening court sessions with `God save the United States and this 
honorable court.'"  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring).  However, we do not think the policy before us can 
be saved merely by the Board proclaiming that the policy serves a 
solemnizing purpose.  See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) 
(posting the Ten Commandments on the walls of public school 
classrooms violated the purpose prong of Lemon despite the 
state's avowed secular purposes of teaching the values conveyed 
by the Ten Commandments and demonstrating their connection to the 
legal system); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24.   
     Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Version D serves the 
secular purpose of solemnizing one's graduation, we believe it 
does so in a constitutionally impermissible manner.  Students who 
are devoutly religious may feel that prayer is not something that 
should be put to a vote.  Such students may even have a religious 
objection to such a vote and may, therefore, refuse to vote out 
of religious conviction.  Version D puts such students on the 
horns of an impossible dilemma by forcing them to chose between 
doing violence to their own religious beliefs and voting, or 
abstaining and thereby risking that their forbearance may provide 
the margin of victory for those with a different religious 
preference.  Regardless of how the referendum comes out, this 
state policy has forced such a student into an impossible, and 
impermissible, choice.  Accord Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32 ("The 
Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on 
the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too 
personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its `unhallowed 
perversion' by [the State].").  Still other students may face a 
similar predicament because they are atheists and refuse to vote 
out of conscience -- as is their right.  Such a Hobson's choice 
"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community . . . ."  Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  The Constitution forbids that 
message, just as it forbids the procedure authorized by this 
policy. 
                (2) The Endorsement of Religion 
     Under the second prong of Lemon, a government practice can 
neither advance, nor inhibit religion.  This means that a 
challenged practice must "not have the effect of communicating a 
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion."  
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 692.  This endorsement test has at times been 
characterized as part and parcel of the Lemon test, and at 
other times as separate and apart from it.  Whether "the 
endorsement test" is part of the inquiry under Lemon or a 
separate inquiry apart from it, the import of the test is the 
same.  We must determine whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the challenged practice conveys a message favoring 
or disfavoring religion.  "The question under endorsement 
analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view 
such longstanding practices as a disapproval of his or her 
particular religious choices . . . ." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  Thus, the viewpoint of the 
reasonable observer (adherent or nonadherent) helps us to 
determine if the "principal or primary effect [is] one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion."  Lemon, 404 U.S. at 612; 
see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 
(1985).  In any such inquiry, "the `history and ubiquity' of a 
practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in 
which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged 
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of 
religion."  Id. at 630.  
     The importance of the context of a challenged practice is 
illustrated by comparing the holding of the Court in Lynch with 
the holding in Allegheny.  In Lynch, the Court held that a city 
did not offend the Establishment Clause by including a creche 
depicting the Nativity scene, along with other figures and 
decorations traditionally associated with Christmas, in its 
Christmas display in a private park in the downtown shopping 
district.  465 U.S. at 687.  In addition to figures associated 
with the Nativity scene, the creche contained "a Santa Claus 
house, reindeer . . ., candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree," 
and numerous other figures including a clown, elephant and teddy 
bear.  Id. at 671.  Notwithstanding the religious significance of 
the creche, the Court reasoned that "[w]hen viewed in the proper 
context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent that . . 
. the inclusion of the creche is [not] a purposeful or 
surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental 
advocacy of a particular religious message."  Id. at 680.  The 
Court felt that the creche "depict[ed] the historical origins of 
this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday." 
Id.   
     In Allegheny, the Court again addressed the 
constitutionality of a creche displayed as part of a city's 
holiday celebration.  There, unlike in Lynch, the creche was 
located on the Grand Staircase of the county courthouse.  492 
U.S. at 578.  The display was also surrounded by a fence and 
poinsettia floral frame and included small evergreen trees, but 
unlike the display in Lynch, did not include figures of Santa 
Claus, reindeer, or other decorations traditionally associated 
with the secular aspects of Christmas.  Id. at 580-81.  The Court 
noted that the location of the creche on the Grand Staircase of 
the Allegheny County Courthouse -- "the `main' and `most 
beautiful part' of the building that is the seat of county 
government," id. at 599 -- would make it almost impossible for 
any reasonable viewer to "think that it occupie[d] this location 
without the support and approval of the government."  Id. at 599- 
600.  Accordingly, the Court ruled that the display was an 
impermissible endorsement of religion under Lemon.  
                    Lynch teaches that government may celebrate 
                    Christmas in some manner and form, but not in 
                    a way that endorses Christian doctrine.  
                    Here, Allegheny County has transgressed this 
                    line.  It has chosen to celebrate Christmas 
                    in a way that has the effect of endorsing a 
                    patently Christian message: Glory to God for 
                    the birth of Jesus Christ.  Under Lynch, and 
                    the rest of our cases, nothing more is 
                    required to demonstrate a violation of the 
                    Establishment Clause. 
          Id. at 601-02. 
     However, the Court upheld the city's display of a Chanukah 
menorah placed next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting 
liberty, all of which were located just outside the City-County 
Building.  Id. at 620-21.  In doing so, the Court reasoned: 
          [T]he relevant question for Establishment 
          Clause purposes is whether the combined 
          display of the tree, the sign, and the 
          menorah has the effect of endorsing both 
          Christian and Jewish faiths, or rather simply 
          recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah 
          are part of the same winter-holiday season, 
          which has attained a secular status in our 
          society.  Of the two interpretations of this 
          particular display, the latter seems far more 
          plausible . . . . 
Id. at 616.  Accordingly, the reasonable observer would not 
necessarily interpret the display as an endorsement of 
Christianity and Judaism.  
     We can not say the same of Version D.  Viewing it in context 
with the "longstanding tradition" it attempts to perpetuate after 
Lee would certainly leave the reasonable nonadherent with the 
impression that his or her religious choices were disfavored. 
This is particularly true where, as here, prayer would have been 
conducted at graduation based upon a plurality even though a 
majority of seniors voted not to have prayer.   
     Although it is true that Version D does not require the view 
that prevails in any given year to prevail in subsequent years, 
it is nonetheless true that the effect of the particular prayer 
that is offered in any given year will be to advance religion and 
coerce dissenting students.  See Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 
1526, 1534-35 (11th Cir.) ("The primary effect of prayer is the 
advancement of one's religious beliefs."), reh'g denied, 713 F.2d 
614 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 924 (1984).  The 
Constitution's "prohibition against governmental endorsement of 
religion `preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to 
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief 
is favored or preferred.'"  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (quoting 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70); see also Texas Monthly, Inc. 
v. Bullock 489 U.S. 1, 27, 28 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
the judgment) ("government may not favor religious belief over 
disbelief" or adopt a "preference for the dissemination of 
religious ideas").   
     The disclaimer that is required by Version D does weigh in 
favor of the Board's position under a Lemon analysis.  However, 
it does not weigh so heavily as to neutralize the counterweight 
of the advantage the policy gives religious speech over secular 
speech.  Despite the printed disclaimer, the reasonable observer 
here could not help but conclude that the Board favors the 
inclusion of prayer. 
     "[N]ot every law that confers an `indirect,' `remote,' or 
`incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, 
constitutionally invalid."  Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771 (citation 
omitted).  However, Version D provides a benefit that is neither 
"indirect," "remote," nor "incidental."  The Supreme Court has 
never countenanced a practice that requires some members of a 
community to subordinate their religious preferences to those of 
a majority.  Rather, "[t]he Establishment Clause, at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on 
questions of religious belief or from `making adherence to a 
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the 
political community.'"  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94 (quoting 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).  
     Although the Supreme Court has allowed certain 
accommodations to religion, see Corporation of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1987) 
(upholding law exempting religious employers from Title VII); 
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314-15 (upholding statutory "released time" 
program whereby public schools release students during the school 
day to receive off-site religious education), "accommodation is 
not a principle without limits."  Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 
2492.  The Supreme Court "[has] never hinted that an otherwise 
unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious 
group could be saved as a religious accommodation."  Id. at 2493.  
As Justice Souter explained in Lee: 
               Religious students cannot complain that 
          omitting prayers from their graduation 
          ceremony would, in any realistic sense, 
          'burden' their spiritual callings.  To be 
          sure, many of them invest this rite of 
          passage with spiritual significance, but they 
          may express their religious feelings about it 
          before and after the ceremony.  They may even 
          organize a privately sponsored baccalaureate 
          if they desire the company of like-minded 
          students.  Because they accordingly have no 
          need for the machinery of the State to affirm 
          their beliefs, the government's sponsorship 
          of prayer at the graduation ceremony is most 
          reasonably understood as an official 
          endorsement of religion . . . . 
505 U.S. at 629-30 (Souter, J., concurring).  
     Whatever accommodation may require, it is clear that 
government neutrality toward religion still is the hallmark of 
the Religion Clauses.  See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487 ("A 
proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment 
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of `neutrality' 
toward religion, favoring neither one religion over others nor 
religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.") (internal 
quotations and citation omitted).  Version D can not be justified 
as an accommodation because it seeks to accommodate the 
preference of some at the expense of others and thereby crosses 
the required line of neutrality.  "The First Amendment . . . 
gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own 
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious 
necessities."  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 
710 (1985) (internal quotations and citation omitted).    
             (3) Excessive Entanglement With Religion 
     The third prong of the Lemon test -- no excessive 
entanglement of government with religion -- is a much closer 
question.  As noted earlier, the state's involvement here is far 
less than the entanglement that was present in Lemon.  However, 
because we find that Version D of Policy IKFD violates the first 
two prongs Lemon, we need not determine if it also violates the 
third prong.  
                          V. CONCLUSION 
     In closing, we emphasize the difficulty posed by the issue 
that we confront here and the intensity and sincerity of persons 
on both sides.  Issues of religion touch litigants and interested 
observers of the law as few other issues can.  For example, one 
of the students who opposed Version D testified before the 
district court that he received threatening letters in his school 
locker and threatening telephone calls at home after coming 
forward in this case.  App. at 93.   
     References to, and images of, religion are to be found 
throughout this society.  See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14.  Yet, 
the prevalence of religious beliefs and imagery cannot erode the 
state's obligation to protect the entire spectrum of religious 
preferences from the most pious worshipper to the most committed 
atheist.  Those preferences are the business of the individual, 
not the state nor the public schools it maintains.  The First 
Amendment does not allow the state to erect a policy that only  
respects religious views that are popular because the largest 
majority can not be licensed to impose its religious preferences 
upon the smallest minority. 
     We need not now address the parameters of these prohibitions 
beyond the precise questions raised by the specific policy before 
us.  The district court's order enjoined the School Board "from 
conducting a school-sponsored graduation ceremony that includes a 
prayer, whether it be an invocation, a benediction or a prayer in 
any other form."  App. at 210.  In context, we understand the 
district court's order to foreclose a school-sponsored graduation 
service involving an invocation, benediction or prayer pursuant 
to Policy IKFD Version D.  As so read, we affirm the judgment of 
the district court.  
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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by Judges Nygaard, 
Alito and Roth. 
 
 
      I must dissent because I believe the issue squarely before 
us, whether student-initiated, -directed and -composed prayer at 
high school graduation violates the First Amendment, requires 
that we examine the application of both the Establishment Clause 
and the free exercise/free speech right, balancing the graduates' 
free exercise and speech rights against any compelling state 
interest which might otherwise justify impinging these 
guarantees. 
     In placing these interests on the balance scale, I am 
concerned, however, that an approach which exaggerates and 
emphasizes the Court's Establishment Clause tests would be 
fragmented and would tend to imply that the First Amendment 
religion clauses embody contradictory and irreconcilable 
principles.  The Court's free exercise jurisprudence clearly 
suggests that a separation policy which overextends into the 
domain of free exercise and free speech must be suspect.  The 
Establishment Clause should not be read to prohibit activity 
which the Free Exercise Clause protects.  Board of Educ. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) ("there is a crucial difference 
between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses 
protect").  Thus, I would analyze the present case in light of 
the fact that while the state may not establish a religion, it 
must not also disadvantage or discriminate against studentreligious 
activity, nor imply that religion, or religious acts, 
are disfavored.  
     In light of the Establishment Clause's broad purpose to 
serve the free exercise of religion, I would hold that here the 
narrowly fact-bound holding of Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 
(1992), does not preclude such student directed, composed and 
delivered prayer as an integral segment of the graduation 
ceremony, where there is not, by policy, virtually any school 
administration or faculty involvement.  In addition, applying the 
Court's three-part Establishment Clause analysis articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), I would hold that the 
defendants' challenged activity also meets the Lemon test as to 
compliance with the Establishment Clause.  Finally, I would 
conclude that the state has not articulated any compelling 
interest to countermand the graduates' rights of free exercise 
and free expression.  Thus, I would reverse the permanent 
injunction issued against the defendants. 
 
                                I. 
     In Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that Lee, a middle school 
principal who decided to include prayer in the graduation 
ceremony for Deborah Weisman, chose a rabbi to offer the prayer, 
gave the rabbi guidelines on the content of the prayer, and 
advised the rabbi that the invocation should be non-sectarian, 
made choices attributable to the state.  Moreover, the Court held 
that Lee's advice concerning the content of the rabbi's prayer 
constituted direct state control.  These findings, combined with 
the Court's finding that the school's supervision and control of 
high school graduation subtlely coerced graduates to stand in 
respectful silence during the invocation, rendered the state 
action unconstitutional, despite the fact that participation in 
the prayer or in the graduation ceremony itself was voluntary.  
112 S. Ct. at 2655-56.  Emphasizing that the particular facts in 
the case were outcome-determinative, the Court stated: 
     These dominant facts mark and control the confines of 
     our decision:  State officials direct the performance 
     of a formal religious exercise at promotional and 
     graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.  Even for 
     those students who object to the religious exercise, 
     their attendance and participation in the state- 
     sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real 
     sense obligatory, though the school district does not 
     require attendance as a condition for receipt of the 
     diploma.   
 
112 S. Ct. at 2655. 
     Adverting to the "heightened concerns with protecting 
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the 
elementary and secondary public schools," id. at 2658, the Court 
asserted that the effort on the part of the school official to 
"monitor prayer will be perceived by the students as inducing a 
participation they might otherwise reject."  Id. at 2657.  The 
Court declined to apply the factors it earlier set forth in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, or to explicitly reconsider the status of that 
decision. 
     Because of the highly fact-sensitive nature of the Leedecision, I 
cannot induce from the Court's reasoning any broad 
constitutional principle which bans prayer at all high school 
graduation ceremonies, regardless of the manner in which the 
decision to include prayer is made or implemented.  Indeed, Leebids us to 
scrutinize and to distinguish the facts of each case.  
In Lee the Court found the following, working in tandem, to 
constitute state sponsorship: 
     1)   The high school principal, a state actor, made a 
unilateral decision to include an invocation and benediction in 
the graduation ceremony; 
     2)   The high school principal, a state actor, made a 
unilateral decision with regard to the selection of a clergyman 
to offer the invocation and benediction; and 
     3)   The high school principal, a state actor, actively 
influenced and monitored the content of the invocation and 
benediction to be given.   
     The case before us contains neither the indicia of state 
action nor the particular facts which were outcome- determinative 
in Lee.  Here the graduates are entirely entrusted with the 
decision to include or not to include a graduation invocation.  
The graduates maintain control throughout the decisional process 
and without the active or surreptitious influence or monitoring 
by school officials.  Policy IKFD precludes the invitation of a 
clergyman to deliver any invocation.  No school official may 
influence or monitor the content of the prayer.  The polling 
instrument itself is neutral.  The government practice in 
question here is not a decision to include prayer at graduation; 
nor is it the practice of monitoring or influencing the content 
of a graduation prayer.  The government practice at issue here is 
the highly democratic one of allowing the graduating class to 
vote on the issue of graduation prayer while maintaining an 
official stance of strict neutrality throughout the entire 
process.  Hence, none of the decisions made by the graduating 
class concerning graduation prayer can be attributed to the state 
and the Establishment Clause is therefore not even implicated.  
I do not find anything in Lee which would compel a holding that 
policy IKFD is unconstitutional. 
     The majority expresses concern over the degree of control 
exercised by the school:  1) when it rejected a student's request 
for a "safe sex" speaker at graduation, and 2) when the principal 
stated that he would not permit an unscheduled speaker.  
Certainly the school, without violating the neutrality principles 
of Lemon, could restrict all speeches as to time and indeed as to 
appropriateness -- here, to "solemnizing" speech; Policy IKFD's 
subject matter and speaker restrictions do not constitute 
viewpoint expression or suppression. 
     I would follow the lead of our sister court of appeals in 
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 
1992), a graduation prayer case factually similar to the case 
before us.  In Jones, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth 
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman, 
which the Court decided subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's first 
determination.  Upon reconsideration, the Fifth Circuit held that 
Lee did not invalidate Clear Creek's graduation and invocation 
policy, which did not mandate prayer or any invocation, but 
merely permitted graduation prayer to be delivered by a graduate 
if the graduating class so chose.  Moreover, in Jones the 
resolution in question permitted a school official to offer 
"advice and counsel" to the graduating class in the decision 
whether to include an invocation at graduation.  This single 
fact, which is absent in the case before us, placed the Jonescase even 
closer to the constitutional boundary established in 
Lee than the case before us.  Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit 
held that Clear Creek exercised significantly less control over 
the invocation content than did the school principal in Lee v. 
Weisman, noting that Clear Creek did not solicit invocations, but 
merely refused to accept sectarian or proselytizing invocations.  
977 F.2d at 971.  The court noted that the resolution merely 
tolerated nonsectarian, non-proselytizing prayer, but neither 
required nor favored it.  Id.   
     By contrast, Black Horse's policy for prayer at graduation 
ceremonies is more liberal in that it extends the scope of its 
toleration to include even sectarian prayer, if the graduates so 
choose.  I believe that in this way Policy IKFD comports with the 
First Amendment's prohibition against the inhibition of the 
practice of religion or of free expression, while at the same 
time precludes even the remote possibility of an establishment of 
religion by virtue of its uncompromising neutrality.   
     I would also find the element of psychological coercion, 
which the Lee Court presumed and the majority stresses, to be 
absent where the graduating seniors have participated in the 
decision regarding prayer at graduation.  There could not be any 
confusion on the part of the reasonable graduating senior, who 
has been made aware of the senior class poll and has been invited 
to participate, with regard to whether the result of that poll 
represents an official opinion of the state or the will of the 
senior class.  Furthermore, although Lee failed to emphasize the 
distinction between high school graduates and the rest of the 
younger, less mature high school student body, prior Supreme 
Court caselaw has acknowledged that post-secondary school 
students are less easily coerced than younger students.  See, 
e.g., Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226, 235-37, 250 (1990) ("university students are . . . 
less impressionable than younger students") (citing Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274, n.14 (1981)).  The graduation 
ceremony itself is a public ritual symbolic of the graduates' 
passage into responsible young adulthood, and is synchronized, 
more or less, with other official acknowledgements of adult 
initiation, such as conference of the right to vote and the 
responsibility of males to register for the draft.   
     In addition to the relative level of maturity of the senior 
class, the very nature of graduation, which elevates the studentto the 
status of graduate, must be considered.  Although the 
student/graduate distinction did not countermand the other 
various facts which the Court in Lee weighed against graduation 
prayer, I believe that the graduation ceremony setting is 
significantly different in nature from the classroom setting, and 
in the absence of other offending factors, warrants a less 
restrictive approach to religion.  Certainly the contested 
activity does not involve the curriculum of the school; nor does 
the graduation ceremony implicate the teacher-student 
relationship concerning the transmission of knowledge from the 
former to the latter.  Thus, the concerns which the Court has 
expressed in those cases where some form of religion has been 
injected into the school curriculum are not directly operative 
here.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) 
(teaching of scientific evidence supporting creation theory); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment of silence at 
beginning of each school day); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 
(1980) (posting of Ten Commandments on classroom walls); Abington 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading over 
PA system before classes); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 
(mandated recitation of official state prayer each day in public 
schools); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 
U.S. 203 (1948) (weekly religious instruction in public school 
buildings during school hours by members of clergy).   
     I do not share the majority's confidence in the Ninth 
Circuit's holding in Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 
447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, ___ 
U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2604, 132 L.ED.2d 849 (1995).  Following the 
precedent set by an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Collins v. 
Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981), the court in Harris held that "the 
school ultimately controls [the graduation] event" and hence 
cannot avoid state involvement so as to implicate the 
Establishment Clause as interpreted under Lee.  41 F.3d at 454.  
The court further held that the seniors' decision regarding 
prayer was per se tainted with official sanction because the 
seniors derived their decisional authority from the delegation of 
official school authority and because "the school under[wrote] 
the [graduation] event" by providing the use of the school 
building.  Id.  In my view, this holding would preclude virtually 
all prayer at a public high school graduation ceremony, a holding 
which unnecessarily and without warrant extends the holding of 
Lee.  I am also concerned that the Ninth Circuit failed to 
distinguish the classroom setting from the graduation setting, 
and the student from the graduate.  41 F.3d at 458.  I find no 
precedent supporting the Ninth Circuit's position that public 
high school seniors "enter[] the domain of the Establishment 
Clause," id., and are precluded from independently choosing to 
communally express their gratitude to God, invoke the divine 
presence or seek God's blessing, as part of their graduation 
ceremony.  Since all aspects of the graduation prayer decision 
are at the discretion of the graduating senior class, I would 
hold that Policy IKFD does not unconstitutionally establish a 
religion under Lee.   
 
                               II. 
     I agree with the majority that the Lemon test is still 
precedential, although from the start it has been the focus of 
critical debate, including the irony that its application 
encourages the federal courts to regulate in an area for which 
the First Amendment was designed to insure against any government 
interference.  I part company in that I believe that Policy 
IKFD does not violate any one of the three elements of Lemon.   
 
                                A. 
     In order to pass the first prong of the Lemon test, Policy 
IKFD need not be shown to be exclusively secular.  Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. at 64 (Powell, J., concurring).  Furthermore, accommodation 
of religion or religious practice in general helps to preserve 
the mediating institutions of the public morals, a secular civic 
good.  Hence, accommodation itself serves a secular purpose.  A 
valid secular purpose is not constitutionally compromised when 
there are incidental, even substantial, benefits to religion.  
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)). 
     To determine a secular purpose, the Court generally has 
exercised deference with regard to stated legislative or policy 
purpose, and will find a sham secular purpose only when there can 
be no question that the challenged conduct establishes, or tends 
to establish, a religion.  Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 416- 
17 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 ("The 
Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the 
ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has 
concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was 
motivated wholly by religious considerations.") (citing Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. at 41; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 
(1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24; 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 424-25); see also Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 586-87. 
     Policy IKFD expressly states, "[i]n the spirit of protected 
free speech, the pupils in attendance must choose to have prayer 
. . . ." (emphasis added).  In addition to this express secular 
purpose of promoting the free speech of the graduating seniors, 
the school asserts that Policy IKFD serves the valid secular 
purpose of permitting the graduates to solemnize the occasion of 
their graduation through ceremonial prayer.  The concern should 
not be, as the majority expresses it, that graduation would not 
be less solemn without the vote.  The importance of ceremonial 
prayer is that the Court has acknowledged that it indeed serves 
the valid secular purpose of solemnization.  See, e.g., Lynch, 
465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring); County of Allegheny 
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-96 n.46 (1989); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21 (1962); see also Jones v. 
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d at 966-67.   
     As the district court noted in the present case, Policy IKFD 
serves yet a third secular purpose which is educational, albeit 
not curriculum-related, in that the process of independently 
coordinating and resolving the issue of graduation prayer permits 
the prospective graduates to gain firsthand insight into the 
effects of current constitutional jurisprudence on their public 
behavior, and is itself an exercise in responsible citizenship.   
     Moreover, the challenged activity here cannot be deemed to 
cause those graduates who are opponents of prayer at graduation, 
for the many different reasons cited by the majority, to feel 
that they are not fully incorporated into the community.  To the 
contrary, every graduate under Policy IKFD is fully invited to 
partake in the community via the right to vote on the issue of 
school prayer, and each individual graduate, regardless of his or 
her position on the issue, has an equal opportunity to influence 
the graduation ceremony.  Here the challenged activity is a 
democratic exercise.  There is no guarantee that the view that 
prevails in any given year will prevail in the following year.  
The reasonably tolerant graduate, knowing of his or her 
opportunity to partake in the class poll, cannot reasonably be 
thought to conclude that the state is establishing religion if 
prayer prevails in the poll in any given year.  The non-endorsing 
language of Policy IKFD, the explicit mandatory disclaimer, and 
the neutrality of the polling instrument itself, would lead me to 
hold that the effect of Policy IKFD is not principally or 
primarily to advance religion.  On the other hand, an absolute 
prohibition on ceremonial prayer at graduation would, in my view, 
violate the Free Exercise Clause by unduly inhibiting the 
practice of religion, and would also implicate the free speech 
guarantees of the First Amendment. 
     Given the school's highly credible express secular 
motivations and neutrality of purpose as regards religion, both 
written into Policy IKFD and argued before us, I would find that 
Policy IKFD easily passes the secular purpose test.  The ACLU's 
assertions that Policy IKFD cannot satisfy this prong of Lemonbecause 
prayer is per se religious and that ceremonial prayer 
may not be utilized for purposes of solemnization or freedom of 
expression where wholly secular means are available, go far 
beyond the requirements of the first prong of Lemon, which does 
not require that a secular purpose be achieved via exclusively 
secular means.  Furthermore, the means employed by the school 
towards its secular end pursuant to Policy IKFD is not itself 
intrinsically religious.  Student polling is a wholly secular 
activity, and the result of the poll in question is the 
expression of the graduating class, not the school district. 
   
                                B. 
     With respect to the second prong of the Lemon test, I agree 
that the test asks whether the challenged activity "in fact 
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval."  Lynch, 465 
U.S. at 690.  While it is solidly established that the government 
is precluded from favoring one particular religious denomination 
over another, or from establishing an official state religion, I 
note that the members of the Court divide as to whether the 
Establishment Clause precludes the government from conveying a 
message that it endorses or encourages religion in a generic 
sense, or especially acknowledges or accommodates the broad 
Judeo-Christian heritage of our civil and social order.  This 
division persists despite the Court's attempt to interpret 
comprehensively the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947), holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits the federal and state governments from 
offering non-preferential aid to all religions and from levying 
any tax to support any religious activity or institution.  See, 
e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The 
endorsement test] does preclude government from conveying or 
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular 
religious belief is favored or preferred"); but cf. Wallace, 472 
U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Madison] did not see 
[the First Amendment] as requiring neutrality on the part of 
government between religion and irreligion."); Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) ("To invoke Divine guidance on a public 
body . . . is not . . . an `establishment' . . . or a step toward 
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of 
beliefs widely held among the people of this Country."); Lynch, 
465 U.S. at 673 (The Constitution "affirmatively mandates 
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and 
forbids hostility toward any . . . . `[C]allous indifference' . . 
. was never intended by the Establishment Clause . . . . [and] 
would bring us into `war with our national tradition as embodied 
in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of 
religion.'" (citations omitted)).  In Mergens, the Supreme Court 
unequivocally held that: 
     The Establishment Clause does not license government to 
     treat religion and those who teach or practice it, 
     simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive 
     of American ideals and therefore subject to unique 
     disabilities. 
 
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.  See also Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of University of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995) 
(where government program is neutral toward religion (as Policy 
IKFD is), restrictions on religious speech are not justified by 
the Establishment Clause); such viewpoint discrimination risks 
fostering hostility to religion, undermining the very neutrality 
of the Establishment Clause requires, id. at 2525. 
     The First Amendment does not condemn legislation or official 
policy that has the effect of assisting religion generally; the 
First Amendment itself gives religion an exceptionally protected 
status.  It does not necessitate an interpretation inhospitable 
to religion where religion may not be acknowledged in any public 
arena.  Such an interpretation runs counter to the notion of 
neutrality and denigrates religion in violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983) 
(the Constitution does not "require the complete separation of 
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not 
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility towards 
any . . . .  Indeed . . . such hostility would bring us into `war 
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's 
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.'").  Neutrality may be 
achieved through a policy, such as Policy IKFD, that is as 
hospitable to religion as it is to irreligion.  
     The majority's "reasonable nonadherent" could not be 
confused into thinking that "his or her religious choices were 
disfavored."  Opinion at 33.  Policy IKFD mandates an explicit 
and unequivocal disclaimer, one that covers not only the official 
position of the school but also the views of any of the 
particular graduates, on the graduation program in the event the 
student body votes for the inclusion of prayer at the graduation 
ceremony.   Moreover, the outright ban on graduation prayer 
that the majority espouses would make a reasonable religionist 
believe that his or her exercise of religion was disfavored by 
the state, especially against the pervasive backdrop of a century 
and a half of prayer at such gatherings. 
 
                                C. 
     Because I find that the first two Lemon prongs are not 
violated, I (unlike the majority) must move to the third prong, 
whether Policy IKFD fosters excessive institutional entanglement 
between the church and the state.  Lemon discusses two ways in 
which entanglement can be excessive.  Entanglement may be 
implicated when a state policy or legislative act draws the state 
into an intimate and continual monitoring or overseeing of 
religious matters.  403 U.S. at 614-22.  Entanglement may also be 
implicated where a state policy or legislative act creates an 
abnormal potential for political divisiveness.  403 U.S. at 622.  
The Court has indicated, however, that political divisiveness 
alone will not create an entanglement.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 
(". . . this Court has not held that political divisiveness alone 
can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct").  The 
Court has also recognized that "[e]ntanglement is a question of 
kind and degree."  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.   
     I find nothing in Policy IKFD which resembles the enduring 
entanglement identified in Lemon.  By design Policy IKFD creates 
a virtual total absence of administrative entanglement of any 
sort.  With regard to political divisiveness, Policy IKFD 
involves absolutely no sponsorship or subsidy to any religious 
institution or related organization.  There is nothing in the 
record which would suggest that Policy IKFD engenders or will 
engender so high a degree of political divisiveness as to pose "a 
threat to the normal political process."  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 
(citations omitted).  On the other hand, I would not attribute 
the political divisiveness, to whatever extent it may or may not 
exist, which this lawsuit itself engenders, to Policy IKFD.  SeeLynch, 465 
U.S. at 684-85 ("A litigant cannot, by the very act of 
commencing a lawsuit, . . . create the appearance of divisiveness 
and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement.")  I do not find 
any evidence of excessive entanglement and am thus satisfied that 
Policy IKFD satisfies all three prongs of the Lemon test. 
 
                               III. 
     In closing, I must challenge the majority's view that "the 
prevalence of religious beliefs and imagery cannot erode the 
state's obligation to protect the entire spectrum of religious 
preferences from the most pious worshipper to the most committed 
atheist."  Opinion at 37.  The Free Exercise Clause guarantees 
against the interference of the state in expressive and 
associational religious activity.  The free speech clause is a 
related, but more generic, guarantee for a broad range of 
expressive and associational activity.  It is well-acknowledged 
that neither clause offers unlimited protection for such 
activities.  It is equally well-acknowledged that the state may 
not impinge the interests of free exercise and free speech 
without proffering a compelling state interest and demonstrating 
the necessity of its restrictive action. 
     Aside from the ACLU's assertion that Policy IKFD establishes 
or tends to establish a religion, it offers no compelling reason, 
constitutional or otherwise, for a permanent injunction against a 
senior class' free choice to express thanks through its own 
prayer at a graduation ceremony.  Thus, I believe the free 
exercise and free expression interests of the graduating class of 
Highland Regional High School must prevail. 
